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n John Grisham's best-selling novel
The Rainmaker, a young man dies of
leukemia because his health insurance
company wrongly refuses to pay for the
bone marrow transplants that probably
would have saved his life. An outraged
jury awards punitive damages of $50
million. The evil insurer in this story is
no more. But what about real-life insur-
ers with equally insidious tactics? Is gov-
ernment, by its failure to prevent such
abuses, acting as the insurer's evil twin?
Should we in fact blarne government for
its failure to ensure timely care?
The underlying question here is
whether healthcare is a human right, such
that government is ethically required to
act for the benefit of the individual in
need of healthcare services. A human
right, the existence of which derives from
principles of natural law, is based in the
dignity and worth of the human being.
Thus, the right exists regardless of
whether positive law has given it expres-
sion; a human right not recognized by
positive law is a failure in the law, not an
absence of the right. A just government is
compelled to recognize the rights of its
citizens. Is healthcare such a right, such
that a just government is compelled to
provide for it by positive law? The com-
plexity of the problem in the United
States--where needed healthcare is often
denied within the structure of a health-
care system designed for extraordinary
feats of technical virtuosity and dramatic
pharmaceutical achievements-empha-
sizes the complexity of the human rights
query. The solution cannot be a visceral
appeal to faith. Rather, it must be consid-
ered in its component parts.
Any general right to healthcare is
comprised of at least three different types
of rights, each of which must be consid-
ered for its weight or credibility in the
history and diversity of societies. First, a
right exists to be free from government
interference in securing healthcare, e.g.,
the right to choose abortion over child-
birth (or vice versa), or to choose treat-
ment over nontreatment (or vice versa).
Second is a right to be free from wrong-
ful discrimination in securing healthcare,
a right paralleling generally recognized
rights to freely seek housing, education,
employment, and public accommoda-
tion. Third, a right exists to receive
healthcare services provided or assured
by government to those who need them,
for the well-being of all or specifically for
the well-being of the individual. This
might be termed "a right to services."
The third statement of right seems to
capture the heart of the American debate
over a "human right to healthcare." It is
easy to forget the affluence and infrastruc-
ture underlying such an assertion of
health services rights for each and all.
The United Nations Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights (UDHR), celebrat-
ed for its fiftieth anniversary this year,
states in Article 25 no more than the prin-
ciple that all are guaranteed the right to a
standard of living adequate for health and
well-being, including medical care. The
rights to dignity and equality of Articles 1
and 2 have been interpreted, with regard
to healthcare, to be incompatible with
healthcare systems that respond to politi-
cal and war prisoners with faulty or
absent medical care, or compel women
to suffer great risks and frequent disease
and early death by their reproductive
policies. Fifty years ago, when the UDHA
was written, torture was even more com-
mon than today and provided the context
to the rights articulated there.
These statements of international pol-
icy, however bold, fall far short of an
assertion of the right to government-
assured healthcare. On the other hand,
they do endorse the existence of human
rights to healthcare in the sense that
there is some true minimum of health-
care below which intolerable circum-
stances Occur, i.e., circumstances in
which the society must be considered
significantly broken if it does not
respond. But these truly minimal stan-
dards are not the aspirations of human
rights advocates, who do and should
seek to discover what a healthier society
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must do to fulfill its obligations for the
health of its citizens. Rather, those aspi-
rations, and the rest of this article, place
the debate squarely in the context of the
government and society called upon to
recognize the extent of some broader
human right, and to try to define that
right in terms of other rights already
secured. The inquiry requires an initial
consideration of the scope and complexi-
ty of the rights in the first and second
statements: government should not inter-
fere; government should prohibit wrong-
ful discrimination in healthcare.
The right to be free from government
interference in securing healthcare fol-
lows the classic formulation of a legally
recognized right. Both the Magna Carta
and the American Bill of Rights focus on
protection of the individual against the
wrongful use of governmental power.
The right to be free of oppressive and
arbitrary government interference gener-
ally enjoys widespread popular and criti-
cal support from the political right and
left. When the government interferes, the
question is whether it is doing so ratio-
nally and in the public interest.
Government interferes in many ways
with our efforts to secure healthcare.
Licensing requirements for healthcare
workers and healthcare facilities reduce
consumer choice and increase cost, both
significant forms of interference in the
consumer's selection of care. Approval
requirements for new drugs limit personal
choices, and perhaps even fatally so, to
the extent that the patient is dead before
the treatment is available, as asserted in
the era of L aetrile for cancer and, more
recently, new drugs for AIDS. Some
healthcare transactions are absolutely
prohibited, such as the purchase of
human organs from willing sellers, while
most children in need of transplants die
on government-mandated waiting lists.
The principal means of assuring
healthcare in the United States is employ-
er-based insurance, but the economy
calls for frequent job changes for many,
not for lifelong employment. Approxi-
mately 13 percent of the population has
been uninsured at some time in the past
five years, possibly for extended periods.
Up to 30 percent are considered to be
underinsured (i.e., exposed to great finan-
cial hardship in the event of a serious ill-
ness). These market failures are partly the
fault of government interference. Govern-
ment increases the cost of care by endors-
ing (and subsidizing) extended, high-cost
training for physicians before they can
seek state licensing. States require that
basic healthcare coverage include specif-
ic benefits regardless of whether the poli-
cy purchaser wants that coverage,
increasing the cost to each policyholder
in the risk pool. The federal government
in the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)
reduced insurers' freedom to exclude
new enrollees in employment plans, and
shortened the period for which coverage
can be denied if the enrollee has preexist-
ing conditions. While this decreases the
number of uninsured and underinsured
among those with job changes and preex-
isting conditions, it increases the overall
cost of coverage for those in the risk pool.
Government raises the rates for institu-
tional care by limiting the high-tech infra-
structure in a region. With only one costly
MRI facility, there can be no MRI price
war. Government has also established
detailed institutional quality assurance
standards, leading to accreditation, for all
hospitals receiving Medi-care payments.
Though voluntary, the need for accredita-
tion is so powerful that no hospital with
more than twenty-five beds forgoes it.
All these forms of government inter-
ference might be justified, and in law are
justified, by the state's responsibility for
health and welfare. Provided the man-
dates reasonably address a legitimate
public concern, the individual right must
yield to the well-being of the society.
In healthcare regulation, the govern-
ment interferes with individual efforts to
secure healthcare by raising standards to
protect the public from bad care. Surely,
the consumer, whether well or already
ill, has difficulty discerning quality in
healthcare, or even avoiding deadly or
useless treatments. Substandard care may
indeed be more to be feared than exces-
sive government regulation. Government
is often regarded as a do-gooder in its
healthcare role, and many of us hope
that it does what it must to keep away the
incompetents and quacks. Recognizing
the cost of these interferences, however,
we also hope that the regulation is not
simply protectionist or a giveaway to
some powerful element in the healthcare
industry. Thus, freedom from government
interference is limited by the structures of
quality assurance, and few would elimi-
nate all government interference with pri-
vate healthcare choices.
Freedom from wrongful discrimination
in healthcare is an inescapable corollary
to a general right to equality of treatment.
Government carries out the principle in
programs that provide vaccinations to all
at a given public location, or health
screenings for children at the start of the
public school year regardless of whether
the child attends public schools.
Yet, equal treatment is a standard com-
plicated by the varying needs of individuals
and groups, according to age and sex, as
well as to factors tied to race, religion, and
ethnicity. Government has sought to deliver
some "equal" care that acknowledges dif-
ferences in needs by means of Medicare for
the aged, who statistically have reduced
incomes and higher healthcare costs. Med-
icaid, the federal program for low-income
persons, provides a far broader package of
benefits than Medicare, including eyeglass-
es and dentures, because the poor cannot
afford copayments.
Freedom from discrimination has
been embraced as a right that we can
expect government to enforce not only
when the government itself acts but also
against private actors. Even so, there are
many unresolved healthcare issues relat-
ing to discrimination on the basis of gen-
der, race, religion, national origin, age,
sexual orientation, and disability. For
example, may private insurers exclude
from coverage certain healthcare options
more likely to be needed by a particular
segment of the population, such as
expensive infertility treatments for
women? Should gay and lesbian house-
holds be excluded from eligibility for
family plan health insurance?
Finally, there is the third (and most
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ballyhooed) question surrounding the
right to healthcare-what kind of health-
care services might we have a right to?
Surely, the strongest moral claim on gov-
ernment-provided healthcare involves
the public health, i.e., care provided the
individual that benefits both the individ-
ual and society in general. Government
does in fact do a great deal to ensure the
public health by regulation for safety in
the air and water supply, transportation,
foods, medicines, workplaces, and sani-
tation. More directly, government pro-
vides intervention to limit the spread of
infectious disease. (The treatment of
AIDS, unlike other infectious diseases
that are subject to routine reporting in
public records, is a remarkable example
of collision between individual and pub-
lic interests in the public health sphere.)
Tobacco restrictions, gun control, build-
ing codes, and motorcycle helmets are
examples of the scope of government's
activities that make life in the United
States less hazardous to health than in
nearly any other country in the world.
Whatever one's opinion of a particular
restriction-e.g., only seeing eye dogs in
restaurants-the positive purposes and
high level of protection are undeniable.
After public health, the next most
compelling claim is to healthcare for
imminently life-threatening conditions.
Economic constraints on healthcare occa-
sionally produce a publicized case, gen-
erally an uninsured patient denied surgery
and hospital services. The community
might rally with private funds, or the hos-
pital may eat the cost of care as an invest-
ment in its good name. Yet, aside for the
stabilization of emergency patients man-
dated by the Emergency Medical Treat-
ment and Active Labor Act, there is no
general mandate that healthcare
providers must serve the needy patient.
Protective services, the system of
emergency intervention in domestic
abuse for children and disabled adults, is
chronically short of funds for effective
services in virtually every state. Indeed,
the law supports the principle that the
state is not responsible for the healthcare
of an individual who has not been taken
into the state's custody.
If society need not intervene to prevent
death, as this reasoning suggests, it might
seem difficult to argue that healthcare
should be provided to restore and maintain
health. Yet, it might be more important to
the individual and society to minimize dis-
ability among the living. By this reasoning,
the higher claim to government health
benefits may be for care designed to pre-
vent or treat illness that may not raise the
prospect of imminent death, but threatens
well-being and function.
If we speak of a right to healthcare, we
need to ask: What kind of healthcare? Per-
fectly healthy people seek healthcare sim-
ply to confirm that they are healthy. Some
people seek treatments-vaccines, nutri-
tional and hormonal supplements, surgery
to eliminate genetic cancer risks--as pre-
ventive measures in order to preserve their
health. Some people seek healthcare for
conditions that others would not, such as
minor colds, common balding, or sports
performance enhancement. Few of us
would be willing to recognize, or finance,
a "right" to whatever kind of healthcare a
person might think desirable.
Healthcare is a social and technical
response to a condition of illness,
which has been defined as a condition
that interferes, or predictably will inter-
fere, with natural function. Yet, clearly,
not all lack of natural function is illness.
The controversy over funding and
insurance coverage for Viagra suggests
that some fundamental human activities
outside of work may not be within the
scope of a universal healthcare benefit.
The cue to provide the social response
of healthcare, i.e., to excuse the indi-
vidual from responsibility or activity, or
the technical response of treatment, is
for most people the inability to act in
ways that benefit society. The function
of adults is, unfortunately, generally
considered to be performance of work.
The desirable function of children is
generally considered to be learning. An
appropriate scope of healthcare, greatly
improving the quality of life, could be
delivered using a measure that. means
health generates good function in and
for the society.
Not all individuals are considered to
contribute to society primarily by work
or learning, however. A different stan-
dard for scope of care must be consid-
ered for the old and persons with
disabilities. When work is not desirable
or possible because of infirmities or
chronic impairments, the scope of
healthcare might be defined as services
that promote self-maintenance. We as a
society have endorsed the intention to
maintain chronically disabled persons;
this possible definition expands the
"healthcare" response to potentially
include a range of long-term care ser-
vices as well. The thorny problem of
allocation of scarce and costly interven-
tions is deferred to another article.
The difficult task of defining what
forms of healthcare must be offered in
the insurance marketplace, as required
in health insurance coverage, is at the
leading edge in defining the human right
to services. Government creates the eco-
nomic and social circumstances in
which the need for and delivery of
healthcare services arise. The current
political and economic climate in the
United States presents a rare opportunity
for meaningful progress in understand-
ing and defining the nature of the
human right to healthcare and the gov-
ernment's moral obligation. There is no
assurance that a political process, bal-
ancing the interests of industrial
resources against the wishes of some-
time or prospective patients, will result
in a sound decision about the healthcare
essential for all. Our new surgeon gener-
al calls for equal access, citing lack of
basic care for the poor and unempow-
ered, while the larger question of health
and healthcare remains to be defined for
the society as a whole.
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